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In 2003 the Idaho
legislature prohibited all
Idaho public employers—
including political subdi-
visions such as counties,
municipalities, and
school districts—from
making payroll deduc-
tions for political activi-
ties to a political commit-
tee or other entity autho-
rized to receive the con-
tributions. The Supreme
Court is called upon to
determine whether the
prohibition as applies to
political subdivisions 
violates the First
Amendment.
F I R S T  A M E N D M E N T
May a State Legislature Prohibit State 
Political Subdivisions From Making 
Payroll Deductions for Political Activities?
by Jay E. Grenig
ISSUE
Does the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibit
the Idaho legislature from removing
the authority of state political subdi-
visions to make payroll deductions
for political activities?
FACTS
More than twenty years ago, Idaho
adopted the Right to Work Act,
which declares a state policy that
“[t]he right to work shall not be
infringed or restricted in any way
based on membership in, affiliation
with, or financial support of a labor
organization or on refusal to join,
affiliate with, or financially or other-
wise support a labor organization.”
The Right to Work Act prohibits any
requirement for the payment of
“dues, fees, assessments, or other
charges of any kind or amount to a
labor organization” as a condition of
employment. The Act expressly
authorizes employers to deduct
from employee compensation union
dues, fees, assessment or other
charges for payment to a labor orga-
nization if pursuant to a signed
authorization by the employee. In
1995, the Act was amended to clari-
fy that the Act applied to all
employment, private and public,
including employees of the state and
its political subdivisions. 
The Act’s provision relating to pay-
roll deductions remained unchanged
until 2003. In 2003, the Idaho legis-
lature enacted the Voluntary
Contributions Act (VCA), a series of
amendments to Title 44 of the Idaho
Code, including an amendment to
Chapter 20 (Right to Work). The
Chapter 20 amendment states:
“Deductions for political activities
as defined in chapter 26, title 44,
Idaho Code, shall not be deducted
from the wages, earnings or com-
pensation of an employee.” Idaho
Code § 44-2004(2). “Political activi-
ties” are defined as “electoral 
activities, independent expendi-
tures, or expenditures made to any
candidate, political party, political
action committee or political issues
committee or in support of or
against any ballot measure.” The
VCA also amended Idaho Code 
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§ 67-6605, allowing political com-
mittees to “solicit or obtain contri-
butions from individuals as provided
in chapter 26, title 44, Idaho Code,
or as provided in section 44-2004,
Idaho Code.”
Respondent Idaho Education
Association and other unions repre-
senting public employees filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of
the VCA, naming as defendants
Bannock County Prosecuting
Attorney Mark Heideman, Idaho
Attorney General Lawrence Wasden,
and Secretary of State Ben Ysursa.
The respondents sought declaratory
and injunctive relief from enforce-
ment of Section 44-2004(2) as viola-
tive of their rights to free speech
and equal protection under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The petitioners conceded that sev-
eral provisions of the VCA were
unconstitutional because they
restricted the ability of labor organi-
zations to solicit political contribu-
tions. On cross-motions for summa-
ry judgment with respect to the
remaining substantive provision
banning payroll deductions for polit-
ical activities, the district court held
that the payroll deduction prohibi-
tion violated the First Amendment
to the extent it applied to local gov-
ernment employers and private
employers. It also held, however,
that the payroll deduction ban could
be applied constitutionally to the
state’s own payroll system, i.e., to
employees of the State of Idaho.
Accordingly, the court granted in
part and denied in part both
motions. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n v.
Heideman, 2005 WL 3241745 (D.
Idaho 2005). The secretary of state
and the attorney general appealed
the district court’s ruling that
Section 44-2004(2) is unconstitu-
tional with respect to local govern-
ment employers and school district
employers. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that Idaho, in enacting a statute
prohibiting local government
employers from allowing employees
to make payroll deductions for polit-
ical activities was acting as a law-
maker with the power to regulate,
not as a proprietor managing the
state’s internal operations.
Accordingly, the court said the
statute was subject to strict scruti-
ny. The court held that Section 44-
2004(2) burdens speech by dimin-
ishing the respondents’ ability to
conduct any of the activities defined
by the Idaho Code as “political.”
The court observed that the term
“political activities” is broadly
defined to include virtually all types
of electioneering, including “elec-
toral activities” as well as spending
on behalf of or against candidates,
ballot measures, political action or
issue committees, or parties.
Acknowledging that the law does
not prohibit the respondents from
participating in political activities,
the court found the law hampers
their ability to do so by making the
collection of funds for that purpose
more difficult. The court also noted
that the law on its face prohibits
payroll deductions only for political
activities. According to the court,
this is subject-matter discrimina-
tion, which is a form of content 
discrimination. 
The court sustained the First
Amendment challenge to the payroll
deduction ban as applied to local
government employers, but ruled
that the statute could be applied to
the state’s own payroll system. The
court said the Idaho law banning
payroll deductions for political
activities, as applied to local govern-
ment employers, was not rendered
invalid under the First Amendment
on the theory of government-subsi-
dized speech. While the state subsi-
dized its own payroll deduction sys-
tem, and thus could properly forbid
payroll deductions of its own
employees to be used for union
activities, the court explained that
the state did not subsidize the pay-
roll deduction systems of local gov-
ernments. Pocatello Education
Association v. Heideman, 504 F.3d
1053 (9th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court granted the
petitioners’ request for review.
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association, 128 S.Ct. 1762 (2008).
CASE ANALYSIS
The petitioners argue that the Ninth
Circuit strayed far afield from
accepted First Amendment “forum”
jurisprudence by incorporating a
proprietary-regulatory distinction.
According to the petitioners, that
distinction is not to be found, or
even remotely suggested, in the
Supreme Court’s forum-based deci-
sions. In regulating public entities,
petitioners say the legislature
defines a political subdivision’s
authority and thereby affects a rela-
tionship committed to the states
themselves, and, under the circum-
stances here, not subject to federal
constitutional constraints. The peti-
tioners argue that, in controlling
access to the relevant public
employer payroll systems, Idaho
political subdivisions must comply
with statutory constraints on their
authority. The petitioners declare
that nothing in the First
Amendment precludes a state legis-
lature from requiring its own gov-
ernmental creations to take an
action that, in the absence of such
requirement, the political subdivi-
sion could take without infringing
the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.
According to the petitioners, the
threshold inquiry is whether the
payroll systems of Idaho political
subdivisions are traditional public
forums, designated public forums, or
nonpublic forums. They say the
payroll systems clearly fall outside
American Bar Association
the category of traditional public
forums because their purpose is to
provide for the accurate accounting
and remittance of employee com-
pensation. The petitioners also
assert the payroll systems are not
designated public forums for similar
reasons. 
Contending the payroll system is a
nonpublic forum, the petitioners
argue access to a nonpublic forum
may be denied or limited on
grounds that are reasonable in light
of the forum’s purpose and are oth-
erwise viewpoint neutral. They say
the Idaho statute satisfies the view-
point-neutrality requirement insofar
as it imposes a categorical prohibi-
tion on the use of payroll deduc-
tions for any political activities.
According to the petitioners, the
Ninth Circuit’s use of the First
Amendment to vitiate state legisla-
tive control over political subdivi-
sions cannot be reconciled with the
longstanding rule that the U.S.
Constitution ordinarily imposes no
limits on how state legislatures may
allocate powers and duties to politi-
cal subdivisions. Absent manifest
congressional indication to the con-
trary, the petitioners declare there
is no restriction on state legislative
prerogative to delegate the state’s
authority to political subdivisions. 
It is the petitioner’s position that
the court of appeals’ attempt to
interpose the First Amendment
between the Idaho legislature and
local government entities owing
their existence to legislative action
intrudes dramatically on the “sci-
ence of government” that the
Constitution leaves to the states.
Under that approach, the petitioners
say the legislature would have no
alternative other than assuming per-
vasive control over all aspects of the
operation of a political subdivision’s
payroll system if it desired to regu-
late one discrete practice.
Asserting that the making of politi-
cal contributions and expenditures
constitutes speech for First
Amendment purposes, respondents
argue that Section 44-2004(2), as a
content-based restriction singling
out political speech, is presumptive-
ly invalid and subject to strict
scrutiny. Respondents argue that
Section 44-2004(2), like other pro-
visions of the VCA, targets one kind
of political activity—union political
activity—for special disfavor.
The respondents claim the petition-
ers’ argument that Section 44-
2004(2) should be reviewed only for
reasonableness is without merit.
Respondents say the reasonableness
test petitioners seek to invoke is
applicable only where the govern-
ment is acting as a proprietor, man-
aging its internal operations, rather
than acting as lawmaker with the
power to regulate or license. In such
a case, respondents explain that the
government simply declines to facil-
itate particular speech in its own
forum, but does not obstruct speech
that otherwise would take place in
another entity’s forum. When a gov-
ernment is acting in a proprietary
capacity with respect to a facility or
program, respondents assert it nec-
essarily is in the business of decid-
ing who will have access to the facil-
ity or program; it comes with the
territory that some of those deci-
sions are likely to involve speech
activities.
When the government imposes a
speech restriction in its own forum
in the course of its ongoing manage-
ment of that forum, reviewing the
action only for reasonableness com-
ports with the principle that strict
scrutiny of content-based restric-
tions is not required in a limited
class of cases in which there is only
an inconsequential risk that the
government may be seeking to sup-
press ideas or viewpoints. According
to respondents, it would not com-
port with that principle to apply a
reasonableness standard—instead of
strict scrutiny—to a content restric-
tion imposed by a state that has
reached out, in the capacity of law-
maker rather than proprietor, to
impose a speech restriction in
another entity’s forum.
Observing that local governments,
not the state, are the proprietors of
local government payroll deduction
systems, respondents say there has
been no current or previous exer-
cise of control by the state over
local governments’ administration of
their payroll systems, except for the
subject statute. Consequently,
respondents assert there is no
escaping the fact that, in enacting
Section 44-2004(2) as applied to
local government employees, Idaho
was acting as a lawmaker, not a pro-
prietor. Contrary to petitioners’ con-
tentions, this Court has never
applied a reasonableness test to a
content-based speech restriction in
such circumstances.
According to the respondents, a
local government that plays no role
in advocating (much less in solicit-
ing) the political contributions its
employees make, and simply per-
mits an employee to use payroll
deductions as the means of making
any such contributions the employ-
ee may wish to make, just as the
employer would permit the employ-
ee to use payroll deductions for oth-
er kinds of payments, cannot fairly
be said to be entangling itself in
political activities. Respondents
state that payroll deduction systems
are the only kind of local govern-
ment property or facility that the
Idaho legislature has declared off
limits in connection with political
activities. They note that local gov-
ernments are free to allow employ-
ees—as well as managers and other
officials—to make use of every other
kind of local government property
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or facility for political activities,
even where this would involve polit-
ical partisanship such as is not
involved where an employer merely
grants employee requests to make
use of the payroll deduction system. 
SIGNIFICANCE
The First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of people
peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress
of grievances.” The Fourteenth
Amendment renders that prohibi-
tion applicable to the states. This
case presents a controversy mixed
with First Amendment and federal-
ism concerns. 
The Supreme Court’s decision
would resolve inconsistent reason-
ing and rulings in four separate cas-
es—in three different federal cir-
cuits and an Ohio appellate court—
concerning virtually identical state
statutes. Both the Ninth Circuit in
Pocatello Education Association
and the Tenth Circuit in Utah
Education Association v. Shurtleff,
512 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2008),
held a statutory prohibition of pay-
roll deductions for political activi-
ties to be unconstitutional. The
Sixth Circuit in Toledo Area AFL-
CIO Council v. Pizza, 154 F.3d 307
(6th Cir. 1998), has held a similar
statute to be constitutional. In a
state-court decision, the Ohio Court
of Appeals held a statute prohibiting
payroll deductions for political
activities was unconstitutional
because, “The prohibition on direct
partisan political expression by
labor organizations strikes at the
core of the electoral process and
constitutional freedom of speech.”
United Auto Workers Local Union
1112 v. Philomena, 700 N.E.2d 936,
954 (Ohio App. 1998).
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